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TOO QUICK ON THE TRIGGER: HOW THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S 
REVIEW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS IN MARYLAND SHALL 
ISSUE, INC. V. HOGAN FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
COMPLEXITIES OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
MARIE A. BAUER*  
 
“Jason Aldean was several songs into his set when we heard some 
really loud noises.  I remember one of my friends said fireworks.  
The next thing I knew, it felt like there was an explosion in my face 
and that my face was on fire.  It kind of just hit me: Okay, you’ve 
been shot in the face, and there’s still gunshots going on.  This isn’t 
over.  We got down on the ground.  It was chaos, 22,000 people 
crying and screaming, not knowing what to do.”1  
 
The deadliest mass shooting in American history took place at the Route 
91 Harvest music festival in Las Vegas, Nevada on October 1, 2017.2  A lone 
gunman sprayed bullets from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and 
Casino into a crowd of 22,000 concertgoers.3  The gunman singlehandedly 
fired over 1,100 rounds of ammunition, killing fifty-eight people and injuring 
more than 800.4  The shooting lasted just ten minutes.5 
For much of the American public, this was the first time they learned of 
the existence of a particular firearm accessory—the bump stock.6  A bump 
stock is a device that can be attached to semiautomatic rifles, which shoot 
one bullet per trigger-pull, to increase the firing rate.7  The Las Vegas shooter 
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 1. Anna Silman, Before and After Route 91, CUT (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.thecut.com/2018/10/las-vegas-shooting-year-anniversary-a-survivors-story.html. 
 2. Deadliest Mass Shootings in the US Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 14, 2021), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/19/us/mass-shootings-fast-facts. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Gunman Opens Fire on Las Vegas Concert Crowd, Wounding Hundreds and Killing 58, 
HISTORY (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/2017-las-vegas-shooting. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Martin Kaste, The Politics of Bump Stocks, 1 Year After Las Vegas Shooting, NPR (Sept. 
26, 2018, 5:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/26/650454299/the-politics-of-bump-stocks-one-
year-after-las-vegas-shooting. 
 7. Id.  
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used rifles equipped with legally-owned bump stocks, enabling him to do 
more damage in less time.8  Following the shooting, the public and elected 
officials called for bump stocks and similar devices, such as rapid fire trigger 
activators, to be banned nationwide.9  As lawmakers began looking into 
changing firearms regulations, Gun Owners of America released a statement 
pledging its support for the “half a million bump stock owners [who] will 
have the difficult decision of either destroying or surrendering their valuable 
property.”10 
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan,11 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a statute that deprived 
property owners of the right to possess, manufacture, sell, purchase, transfer, 
transport in-state, or receive a rapid fire gun trigger activator device was a 
“taking” requiring just compensation under the United States Constitution’s 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.12  The court held that the statute was not 
a taking because it did not involve direct physical appropriation of personal 
property by the government.13  The court myopically decided the case, 
relying on a wholly literal interpretation of the statute instead of analyzing 
the statute’s impact on property rights under the conceptual framework 
frequently used by the Supreme Court.14  By summarily dismissing the 
appellants’ arguments, the majority disregarded the Supreme Court’s 
complex regulatory takings precedent.15   
The starkly different approaches employed by the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. showcase the 
inconsistencies in Takings Clause precedent.16  By performing an incomplete 
analysis, the majority missed an opportunity to draw attention to the need for 
the Supreme Court to revisit this area of law.17  The Supreme Court must 
address two questions confounding its takings jurisprudence: (1) whether real 
and personal property should be treated differently under the Takings Clause; 
and (2) whether the creation of categorical tests is an effective means of 
analyzing regulatory takings cases.18  
                                                          
 8. Id.  
 9. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356, 
359 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 10. Gun Owners of America to File Suit Against Arbitrarily ATF Bump Stock Ban, GOA (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www.gunowners.org/gun-owners-of-america-to-file-suit-against-atf-bump-
stock-ban/.  
 11. 963 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 12. Id. at 365. 
 13. Id.  
 14. See infra Section IV.A.  
 15. See infra Sections II–III. 
 16. See infra Section IV.A. 
 17. See infra Section IV.A.  
 18. See infra Section IV.B. 
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As to the first issue, the Court should hold that real property and 
personal property must be given equal consideration under the Takings 
Clause.19  As to the second issue, the Court should reconsider its use of 
categorical takings classifications and instead rely on a multi-factor test that 
can account for the myriad of elements frequently encountered in modern 
takings cases.20  If the Supreme Court clarifies its takings jurisprudence, 
cases like Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. could be decided by lower courts more 
consistently.21 
I.  THE CASE 
On April 24, 2018, Maryland Governor Lawrence Hogan signed Senate 
Bill 707 (“SB-707”) into law.22  SB-707 made it illegal, starting October 1, 
2018, for any person to “manufacture, possess, sell, offer to sell, transfer, 
purchase, or receive a rapid fire trigger activator” or to “transport” such a 
device into the State of Maryland.23  The statute defined “rapid fire trigger 
activator” as “any device . . . constructed so that, when installed in or 
attached to a firearm: the rate at which the trigger is activated increases; or 
the rate of fire increases.”24  Proponents of banning rapid fire trigger 
activators stated that such devices “turn legal weapons into machineguns”25 
and “mak[e] a semi-automatic weapon into an automatic weapon.”26  
An exception clause purported to allow pre-existing owners to continue 
to possess a “rapid fire trigger activator” if they applied and received 
authorization to possess the device from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) before October 1, 2018.27  On 
the day SB-707 went into effect, the ATF released an advisory statement 
                                                          
 19. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 20. See infra Section IV.B.2.  
 21. See infra Section IV.C. 
 22. Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 356, 359 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 23. Id.; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-305.1 (West 2021). 
 24. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. § 4-301(m)(1)–(2) (West 2021) (including in the definition 
of rapid fire trigger activator “a bump stock, trigger crank, hellfire trigger, binary trigger system, 
burst trigger system, or a copy or a similar device, regardless of the producer or manufacturer”); see 
also Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,515, 66,534 (Dec. 26, 2018) (describing a “bump-
stock-device” as effectively converting a semiautomatic firearm into a machine gun by “harnessing 
the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm” in a manner which allows the trigger to reset and 
continue firing without additional trigger manipulation by the shooter). 
 25. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356, 
359 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Application of the Definition of Machinegun to “Bump Fire” Stocks 
and Other Similar Devices, 83 Fed. Reg 37, at 7949 (Feb. 20, 2018)); see also id. at 404 (“In crafting 
the law, legislators expressed concern about mass shootings, the lethality of firearms equipped with 
bump-stock-type devices, their unregulated status, and the danger to public safety.”). 
 26. Id. at 404–05 (quoting Testimony of Sen. Victor R. Ramirez in Support of SB-707 at 2, S. 
Judicial Proceedings Comm., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018)). 
 27. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360. 
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explaining that the agency was “without legal authority to accept and process 
[the exception] application,” and that any such application it received from a 
Maryland resident would be “returned to the applicant without action.”28  
In response to SB-707, Maryland Shall Issue (“MSI”), a non-profit gun 
owners’ rights group, and four of its members filed a putative class action 
against Hogan in the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland.29  MSI alleged that the government must pay just compensation 
because SB-707 was a per se taking under the United States Constitution’s 
Takings Clause.30  Hogan moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 
a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).31  
After a hearing, the district court granted Hogan’s motion with respect 
to all counts in MSI’s complaint.32  The district court stated that SB-707 was 
not a per se taking under any theory previously recognized by the Supreme 
Court because the devices were personal property, and the ban did not involve 
direct physical appropriation of the property.33  The court characterized SB-
707 as a “legitimate exercise of the state’s traditional police power,” and 
“consistent with the long history of state laws that criminalize, ban, or 
otherwise restrict items deemed hazardous.”34  MSI appealed the dismissal 
of its complaint to the Fourth Circuit.35  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause addresses 
instances when the government may interfere with private property rights 
without paying compensation.36  The regulatory takings doctrine arose from 
this jurisprudence and is implicated when a property owner asserts that a 
                                                          
 28. Id. at 360; see also id. at 369 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The ATF, a federal agency, lacks the authority to assess applications for the 
State of Maryland.”). 
 29. Id. at 369. 
 30. Md. Shall Issue, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 407–08 (enumerating that MSI alleged three additional 
theories of relief in its complaint which will not be addressed in this Note: that SB-707 
retrospectively revoked vested property rights in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights; that SB-707 was unconstitutionally vague; and that ATF’s refusal to process applications 
for continued possession of the devices imposed a “legally impossible condition precedent”); see 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”); see also United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (stating that 
“just compensation,” in the context of Takings Clause cases, generally equals “the market value of 
the [taken] property at the time of the taking”). 
 31. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 32. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360. 
 33. Md. Shall Issue, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 413–14. 
 34. Id. at 408–09. 
 35. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360. 
 36. Id. at 364. 
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government regulation has improperly infringed on private property rights.37  
The Court has struggled to delineate between a compensable regulatory 
taking versus an exercise of the government’s police power, which requires 
no compensation.38  Additionally, the nature of the property subject to 
regulation, whether real or personal, may impact the Court’s rulings.39  
Section II.A examines the Supreme Court’s interpretations and application 
of the Takings Clause involving regulatory takings.40  Section II.B discusses 
the differential treatment of takings involving real property versus takings 
involving personal property.41  
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution prohibits the taking of private property for public use.42  Before 
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Takings Clause only 
applied to federal takings of private property.43  In 1897, however, the Court 
held that the Takings Clause bound the states as well.44  Originally, the Court 
interpreted the Takings Clause to apply only to actual, physical government 
occupation of property.45  However, in the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the Court recognized that a property-use regulation could also require 
compensation under the Takings Clause.46  The regulatory takings doctrine 
arose from this application of the Takings Clause, attempting to define the 
boundary between a valid exercise of the government’s police power and a 
taking that requires just compensation.47 
The Court has historically avoided creating explicit rules that define 
when a regulation is a taking and when it is not.48  The Court first addressed 
                                                          
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015). 
 40. See infra Section II.A. 
 41. See infra Section II.B. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
 43. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 116 U.S. 226, 226 (1897). 
 44. Id. (holding that the takings provisions of the Fifth Amendment were incorporated by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus were binding on the states). 
 45. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 159–60 (1922). 
 46. Id. at 160. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978) (quoting 
United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 78 S. Ct. 1097, 1104 (1958)) (“[W]hether a particular 
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately 
caused by it depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.’”); see also Horne v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Our Takings Clause 
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the concept of regulations as takings in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. 
Mahon,49 stating that the distinction was a “question of degree[s].”50  In 
Mahon, the Court held that a Pennsylvania statue requiring coal companies 
to leave pillars of coal in place to prevent the subsidence of surface soil was 
a taking.51  The Court stated, “the general rule . . . is that while property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized 
as a taking.”52  Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, identified several 
“fact[s] for consideration” when determining whether a regulation “goes too 
far.”53 Courts should consider whether the regulation “destroy[s] previously 
existing rights of property and contract,” and whether the regulation 
decreases the value of the property.54 The Court failed, however, to define 
the exact amount of loss in value that would invoke the Takings Clause.55  
The Court would not establish its first standard of analysis for when a 
government regulation “goes too far” until more than fifty years later, in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.56  In Penn Central, the Court 
held that a historic preservation regulation that blocked a railroad’s request 
to build an addition on top of an existing historic landmark was a police 
measure and did not require any compensation.57  The Court again 
emphasized that the evaluation of regulatory takings cases is an “essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquir[y].”58  A multi-factor balancing test emerged, 
commonly known as the Penn Central test, outlining factors to be considered 
when determining whether a regulation is a taking.59  The factors considered 
include diminution in value, interference with investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the government action.60  As in Mahon, the 
Court stated in Penn Central that diminution in value was relevant, but did 
not define the loss in value required to effect a taking.61 
                                                          
jurisprudence has generally eschewed ‘magic formula[s]’ and has ‘recognized few invariable 
rules.’”). 
 49. 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). 
 50. Id. at 160. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. at 159–60. 
 54. Id. at 159. 
 55. Id. (“When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise 
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.”). 
 56. 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922). 
 57. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 98 S. Ct. at 2666.  
 58. Id. at 2659. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 2663 (stating that the Court has “reject[ed] the proposition that diminution in property 
value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking’” and noting that the Court has failed to find 
compensable takings even in situations where up to 87.5% of the value of the property was lost).  
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Following establishment of the “ad hoc” Penn Central test, the Court 
outlined two categorical exceptions to this multi-factor approach.62  In 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,63 the Court held that when 
a government regulation results in a permanent physical occupation of real 
property, the regulation is always a taking.64  In Loretto, a New York law 
required that landlords permit cable television companies to install and 
maintain certain facilities on the landlord’s property.65  A landlord purchased 
a building and later discovered cable wires installed on the premises.66  
Because the New York law barred removal of the wires, the landlord filed 
suit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause.67  
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall referenced the concept of 
property as a “bundle of rights.”68  If the government takes a single strand 
from the bundle, the Penn Central approach applies, but if the government 
“chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand,” then the 
categorical rule applies.69  Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, stated that 
the wires allowed tenants to have access to cable television, therefore the 
rental and resale value were likely increased.70  He pointed out that the 
majority disregarded the fact that the permanent physical occupation did not 
“diminish” the value of the property, but in fact likely increased the resale 
value.71  
In contrast to the Loretto Court’s disregard of loss in value, the Court in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council72 elevated loss in value to be the 
deciding factor in a new categorical exception.73  The Lucas Court held that 
regulations that made land “valueless” or denied “all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land” were categorically takings and would not be 
subject to the Penn Central multi-factor test.74  With these two categorical 
approaches, the Supreme Court did not overrule the Penn Central test, but 
created narrow exceptions.75  
                                                          
 62. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015). 
 63. 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). 
 64. Id. at 3171. 
 65. Id. at 3168. 
 66. Id. at 3170. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 3175. 
 69. Id. at 3175–76. 
 70. Id. at 3185 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 3182, 3185. 
 72. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
 73. Id. at 2902. 
 74. Id. at 2893, 2896. 
 75. Id. at 2893; Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3182.  
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The Court further limited the exception from Lucas in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.76  In Tahoe-
Sierra, landowners asserted that a moratorium on development of their 
properties constituted a regulatory taking.77  The Court held otherwise, 
stating that the Lucas categorical approach did not apply because the 
moratorium was temporary.78  The Court reasoned that cases involving 
temporary restrictions or prohibitions or anything short of a “complete 
elimination of value” or a “total loss” required a Penn Central analysis.79  
Thus, the Penn Central analysis remains the default analysis for takings 
cases, with Loretto and Lucas only meant to be applied in rare instances.80 
B. The Treatment of Takings Involving Real Property 
The Court applies the regulatory takings doctrine differently to real 
property versus personal property.81  In Andrus v. Allard,82 a regulation of 
endangered bird feathers in Native American artifacts was found to not be a 
violation of the Takings Clause.83  The Court stated that “government 
regulation—by definition—involves the adjustment of rights for the public 
good.”84  In Andrus, the regulation did not force the owners to surrender their 
property, but they were barred from selling or buying endangered bird 
feathers.85  The Court held that denial of one traditional property right did not 
amount to a taking.86 
Later, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture,87 the Court faced the 
question of whether the Loretto categorical exception for permanent 
government occupations of real property extended to government 
                                                          
 76. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
 77. Id. at 1470.  
 78. Id. at 1484 (“[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a 
taking . . . whereas a temporary restriction that merely cause a diminution in value is not.”). 
 79. Id. at 1483. 
 80. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 2425 (majority opinion). 
 82. 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979). 
 83. Id. at 328; Eagle Protection Act, 50 C.F.R. § 21.2(a) (1978); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 
C.F.R. § 22.2(a) (1978). 
 84. Andrus, 100 S. Ct. at 326. 
 85. Id. at 327; see also id. at 323 (stating that the law forbade all “commercial transactions” 
involving endangered bird feathers, even feathers obtained before the law was enacted, because any 
potential for financial gain would give individuals incentive to continue killing endangered birds 
for their feathers). 
 86. See id. at 327 (“[W]here an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the 
destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in 
its entirety.”).  
 87. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
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appropriations of personal property.88  In Horne, California raisin producers 
were fined for violating a regulation requiring that a certain amount of their 
raisins be diverted into a reserve market where the raisins were sold, 
allocated, or otherwise disposed of in ways that did not compete with the 
commercial market.89  The Court held that a regulation limiting the number 
of raisins that could be released into the commercial market was a categorical 
taking.90  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that Loretto 
defined permanent occupations as chopping through all sticks in the property 
rights bundle, and that this reasoning is “equally applicable to a physical 
appropriation of personal property.”91  In so holding, the Court extended the 
Loretto categorical exception for permanent government invasions of 
property to personal property in addition to real property.92  
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan,93 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland, dismissing MSI’s complaint for 
failure to state a claim.94  Judge Thacker wrote the majority opinion, joined 
by Judge Floyd, holding that SB-707 was not a per se taking requiring just 
compensation under the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause.95  Judge Richardson wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part as to the takings claim, stating that 
SB-707 was a “‘classic’ taking” under the Fifth Amendment.96  
Judge Thacker began by outlining two categories of cases in which the 
Supreme Court had found per se regulatory takings: (1) when a regulation is 
an actual “physical appropriation” as found in Loretto and (2) “‘where [a] 
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land’” as 
found in Lucas.97  Judge Thacker stated that the Supreme Court in Horne had 
extended the per se category from Loretto—direct physical appropriation—
                                                          
 88. Id. at 2425. 
 89. Id. at 2424–25. 
 90. Id. at 2428. 
 91. Id. at 2427. 
 92. Id. at 2427–28. 
 93. 963 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 94. Id. at 359. 
 95. Id. at 367; Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 410 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 
F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 96. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 358, 368 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 97. Id. at 364–65 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992)). 
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to encompass takings of personal property as well as real property.98  She 
explained that the Court, however, had not extended the per se category from 
Lucas—denial of all economic value—to personal property.99  Under Lucas, 
she stated, an owner of personal property “ought to be aware that new 
regulation might even render his property economically worthless” because 
of a “[s]tate’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial 
dealings.”100   
Applying this framework to the facts of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., the 
majority held that SB-707 was not a per se taking.101  Judge Thacker stated 
that because the statute did not require owners of the rapid fire trigger 
activator devices to “turn them over to the [g]overnment or to a third party,” 
it did not involve “physical appropriation” of property like in Loretto and 
Horne.102  Even though SB-707 may render the rapid fire trigger activator 
devices “economically worthless,” Judge Thacker explained that the per se 
category from Lucas—denial of all economic value in the property—is only 
applicable to real property.103  Additionally, she reasoned that the devices’ 
owners must have been aware of the possibility that their personal property 
may lose all value, because the devices fell into an “area[] where the [s]tate 
has a ‘traditionally high degree of control.’”104  Because SB-707 did not fall 
under either of the per se regulatory takings categories outlined by the 
majority, the court held that the statute was not a per se taking under the 
Takings Clause.105 
                                                          
 98. Id. at 366 (“In Horne, the Supreme Court did hold that the first type of per se regulatory 
takings identified in Loretto—direct appropriation—applies to personal property.”). 
 99. Id. (“Horne distinguished Lucas: ‘[w]hatever Lucas had to say about reasonable 
expectations with regard to regulations, people still do not expect their property, real or personal, to 
be actually occupied or taken away.’” (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 365–66 (“In the case 
of land . . . we think the notion . . . that title is somehow held subject to the ‘implied limitation’ that 
the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the 
historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional 
culture.”). 
 100. Id. at 366 (quoting Holliday Amusement Co. of Charleston v. S.C., 493 F.3d 404, 410 (4th 
Cir. 2007)).  In Holiday Amusement Co., the Fourth Circuit held that a ban on the possession or sale 
of certain lawfully acquired gambling machines was not a taking, because gambling was historically 
a highly regulated area and the machine owners were aware that the state could “regulate [gambling] 
minutely or . . . outlaw it completely.”  Holiday Amusement Co., 493 F.3d at 410.  
 101. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367. 
 102. Id. at 366 (emphasis omitted). 
 103. Id. at 367.  
 104. Id. (“We can think of few types of personal property that are more heavily regulated than 
the types of devices that are prohibited by SB-707.”). 
 105. Id. 
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Judge Richardson concurred in part106 and dissented in part, stating that 
SB-707 was a “classic taking” under the Supreme Court’s “classic” takings 
jurisprudence.107  He stated that a “classic taking” was originally understood 
to mean “a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a 
practical ouster of the owner’s possession.”108  Judge Richardson cautioned 
against confusing a classic takings analysis with a regulatory takings 
analysis.109  He explained that a “classic taking” analysis—as opposed to a 
regulatory takings analysis—treats real and personal property the same, is not 
affected by a state’s police powers, and will require compensation if a taking 
is found, no matter how small the economic impact.110  
Judge Richardson defined “property” as “the group of rights inherent in 
the citizen’s relation to [a] physical thing,” which has also been referred to 
by the Supreme Court as a “bundle of rights”—the right “to possess, use and 
dispose of an item.”111  He stated that the government commits a per se 
“classic taking” when it “chop[s] through the bundle,” destroying the owner’s 
property rights.112  Applying this framework, Judge Richardson stated that 
the statute amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment requiring just 
compensation.113  
Judge Richardson stated that SB-707 expressly eliminated a rapid fire 
trigger activator device owner’s property rights “to possess, transport, donate, 
devise, transfer, or sell their device[].”114  He pointed out that the statute 
effectively “require[d] owners to physically dispossess themselves” of the 
devices, because the exception clause was defunct.115  This was “the 
functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner’s possession.”116  
Because SB-707 completely removed the device owners’ property rights—
                                                          
 106. Id. at 370 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(agreeing with “the majority’s (implicit) determination that individual Plaintiffs have standing to 
bring their takings claims”).  
 107. Id. at 368, 379. 
 108. Id. at 371.  
 109. Id. at 372 (“Whatever the role of categorical rules in the ‘more recent’ regulatory-takings 
inquiry, the classic taking, ‘old as the Republic[,] . . . involves the straightforward application of 
per se rules.’”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 373, 375. 
 112. Id. at 375; see also id. at 374 (“[P]hysical occupation is of a special character only 
because—to use the Supreme Court’s metaphor—that occupation ‘chops through the “bundle”’ of 
property rights, rather than takes ‘a single “strand.’”” (emphasis omitted)). 
 113. Id. at 379. 
 114. Id. at 375. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; see also id. at 377 (“Property need not be turned over to the government to effect a 
classic taking. . . . Indeed, property need not physically be turned over to anyone at all—not even a 
‘third party’—for a classic taking to arise.”). 
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chopping through the bundle of rights—he argued that the statute is a “classic 
taking” under the Fifth Amendment.117  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that SB-707, a 
Maryland statute banning rapid fire trigger activator devices, was not a taking 
under the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.118  
The reductive reasoning used by the majority failed to analyze takings 
jurisprudence completely.119  The majority limited application of the 
regulatory takings doctrine to the narrow concept of direct “physical 
appropriations,” instead of also exploring the concept of property as a 
“bundle of rights” as outlined by the dissent.120  The starkly different opinions 
in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. are a symptom of a larger problem: the 
contradictions and inconsistencies in takings jurisprudence result in 
confusion among lower courts.121  The Supreme Court should revisit its 
takings jurisprudence to clarify and simplify the area of law in two ways: (1) 
by holding that real and personal property must be treated equally in all 
takings cases and (2) by abandoning the use of per se categorical takings 
classifications in favor of the Penn Central multi-factor test.122 
Section IV.A discusses how the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. showcase the consequences of the Supreme 
Court’s inconsistent Takings Clause jurisprudence in the lower courts.123  
Section IV.B explores why the Supreme Court should revisit and clarify two 
key issues in Takings Clause precedent.124  Section IV.B.1 discusses the first 
issue—why the Supreme Court should hold that real and personal property 
must be given the same weight in takings cases.125  Section IV.B.2 discusses 
the second issue—why per se categorical classifications should be abandoned 
in favor of a multi-factor test that would be more adaptable to modern takings 
cases.126  Section IV.C applies the two suggested clarifications from Section 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 378–79. 
 118. Id. (majority opinion). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 364; id. at 375 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); see also RAYMOND T. NIMMER ET AL., INFORMATION LAW § 2:3 (2021) (“There are various 
ways to define ‘property’ or ‘ownership.’ The most useful approach holds that property refers to a 
bundle of rights recognized in law in reference to a particular subject matter.”). 
 121. Christopher E. Mills, Raisin Cane?: Takings Jurisprudence After Horne v. Department of 
Agriculture, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 2 (2015). 
 122. See infra Section IV.B. 
 123. See infra Section IV.A. 
 124. See infra Section IV.B. 
 125. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 126. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
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IV.B to the facts of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. to show how a modified 
takings jurisprudence can yield more coherent and equitable results.127   
A. The Competing Theories in Takings Clause Jurisprudence Have 
Resulted in Inconsistency Among Lower Courts 
While courts have reliably found takings in cases involving actual 
physical appropriation of property, courts have applied the Takings Clause 
less consistently when a regulation only affects property rights.128  The 
concept of property as an intangible item, a set of related interests, or a 
“bundle of property rights,” appears throughout Supreme Court takings 
jurisprudence, yet courts do not apply it consistently.129  For example, if SB-
707 from Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. had dictated that rapid fire trigger 
activator device owners must physically give their devices to a government 
agency, the Fourth Circuit would have found a taking.130  In actuality, SB-
707 revoked an owner’s right to possess, manufacture, sell, purchase, 
transfer, transport in-state, or receive a rapid fire trigger activator device.131  
Although the statute does not explicitly state that the owners must turn the 
devices over, the owners are nonetheless compelled under threat of 
imprisonment to “physically dispossess themselves” of the devices.132  The 
result for the device owners is the same in both instances—a total loss of 
property rights—but the court’s holding varied based on the analytical 
framework it used.133  
                                                          
 127. See infra Section IV.C. 
 128. Steven C. Begakis, Stop the Reach: Solving the Judicial Takings Problem by Objectively 
Defining Property, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2016) (“The simplest application of the 
Takings Clause involves a physical appropriation of tangible property.  It involves no philosophical 
speculation or conceptual line drawing—either a government has taken possession of property, or 
it has not. . . . However, the doctrine of regulatory takings is not so clean cut and poses unique 
conceptual challenges in its application.”).  
 129. Compare Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2438 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]here governmental action impacts property rights in ways that do not chop through the bundle 
entirely, we have declined to apply per se rules.”), with Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 
356, 378 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is simply incorrect that the government must destroy every stick in 
the bundle of property rights to effect a taking.”), with Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318, 327 (1979) 
(“At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ 
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”). 
 130. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 366 (stating that SB-707 is not a taking because “SB-707 
does not require owners of rapid fire trigger activators to turn them over to the Government or to a 
third party”). 
 131. Id. at 359. 
 132. Id. at 375 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
 133. Id. at 367 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Mills, supra note 121, at 5 (“The use of an ends-based analysis 
typically results in the taking being characterized as categorical, favoring the property owner.  The 
use of a means-based analysis, by contrast, typically results in a taking being characterized as 
regulatory, favoring the government.”). 
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The majority and dissenting opinions in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. both 
display reasonable—and opposite—conclusions stemming from Supreme 
Court takings precedent, which is precisely the problem with the precedent 
as it stands.134  The Supreme Court has interpreted per se takings in both 
literal and conceptual terms.135  A literal interpretation, used by the majority 
in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., dictates that the government takes property 
when it “actually” or “physically” takes the property.136  Because the 
Supreme Court did not explicitly extend the Lucas “depriv[ation] . . . of all 
economically beneficial use” category to personal property, anything less 
than an actual physical appropriation of personal property is not a per se 
taking.137  The rapid fire trigger devices are personal property, but because 
SB-707 did not explicitly involve physical appropriation, the statute is not a 
taking.138  
Using a conceptual interpretation, employed by the dissent in Maryland 
Shall Issue, Inc., the Supreme Court has held that traditional “property rights 
in a physical thing” are “to possess, use and dispose of it.”139  These property 
rights make up what the Court has termed a “bundle” of rights.140  The Court 
has found takings when government action “chops” through the “bundle.”141  
SB-707 chops through the device owner’s bundle of property rights because 
the statute destroys the owner’s right to possess, transport, donate, devise, 
transfer, or sell their devices.142  In this way, the statute “actually and 
physically defeats [the owners’] property rights”; therefore, the statute is a 
taking.143  
In addition to provoking the competing opinions in Maryland Shall 
Issue, Inc., Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has also led to variance 
                                                          
 134. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Richardson, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also André LeDuc, Twilight of the 
Idols: Philosophy and the Constitutional Law of Takings, 10 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 201, 344–
45 (2019) (“[T]akings cases split the Court, not just as a matter of the outcomes that the justices 
would reach but also as a matter of the reasons for the various decisions.  Justices who vote together 
nevertheless often disagree in their reasoning.  This judicial behavior is powerful evidence that the 
law is not settled and that the Court’s jurisprudence is not broadly accepted as compelling.”). 
 135. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Richardson, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 136. Id. at 365–66 (majority opinion). 
 137. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015); id. at 2437 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  
 138. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 366–67. 
 139. Id. at 374 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 375.  
 143. Id. at 376. 
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among other lower courts.144  In the Ninth Circuit case Duncan v. Beccera,145 
California owners of high-capacity firearms magazines filed suit against the 
California Attorney General, alleging that California Penal Code Section 
32310 was a taking under the Fifth Amendment.146  The statute required that 
lawful owners of firearm magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds 
of ammunition “dispossess them” by removing them from the state, selling 
them to a licensed firearms dealer, or surrendering them to a law enforcement 
agency for destruction.147  The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of California held that the statute was a taking, noting that “California 
will deprive Plaintiffs not just of the use of their property, but of possession, 
one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of property rights. . . . [T]he 
Takings Clause prevents [the State] from compelling the physical 
dispossession of such lawfully-acquired private property without just 
compensation.”148  
The variance in the application of takings jurisprudence exposes the 
need for the Supreme Court to revisit this area of law.149  In its brief, MSI 
pointed out the similar facts between its case and Duncan, as well as the 
analytical approach the Duncan court used for the takings issue.150  The 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, however, dismissed 
Duncan as “[a] single case in a non-controlling jurisdiction that is 
inconsistent with binding authority on related legal questions.”151  Based on 
the existing precedent, it is unlikely that lower courts will conform to the 
same method of analysis in regulatory takings cases: 
[T]here is every reason for the Court to endeavor to develop a 
unified judicial takings doctrine that could equip reviewing courts 
and signal to lower state courts that sloppy or crafty opinions that 
fail to accord proper respect to essential property rights, as well as 
those property rights established in state law, will be at least 
compensated—and, if serious enough, overturned.152  
Property rights are “a bedrock principle of . . . constitutional tradition” 
and it is past time for the Supreme Court to revisit and clarify this area of 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 379. 
 145. 742 F. App’x 218 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 146. Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 742 F. App’x 218 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
 147. Id. at 1110. 
 148. Id. at 1138 (alteration in original). 
 149. Begakis, supra note 128, at 1223. 
 150. Brief of Appellants at 41–42, Md. Shall Issue, Inc., v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(No. 18-2474). 
 151. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 416 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356 (4th 
Cir. 2020). 
 152. Begakis, supra note 128, at 1223. 
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law.153  Especially because, as can be seen in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., 
property rights often intersect with another “bedrock principle” of 
“constitutional tradition”—states’ broad exercise of their police powers to 
protect public safety.154 
B. The Supreme Court Must Revisit its Takings Clause Jurisprudence 
to Clarify the Treatment of Personal Property and Eliminate the 
Use of Categorical Classifications 
The inconsistencies and confusion inherent in the Supreme Court’s 
takings jurisprudence can be minimized by the Court revisiting two 
complications that reappear throughout Takings Clause cases.155  First, the 
Supreme Court has unreasonably developed a preference for the rights of real 
property owners as opposed to the rights of personal property owners.156  
Second, the Supreme Court continued to create categorical takings 
classifications even though the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test 
sufficiently analyzes regulatory takings cases.157  By eliminating these two 
complications from Takings Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court could 
provide lower courts with the coherent guidance required to analyze takings 
cases.158 
1. The Supreme Court Should Hold that Real and Personal 
Property Must be Given Equal Weight in Takings Cases 
The preferential treatment given to real property in takings cases is not 
grounded in the language or origins of the Takings Clause and has 
unnecessarily complicated lower courts’ analyses.159  The text of the Fifth 
                                                          
 153. James W. Ely, Jr., The “Despotic Power” Reconsidered, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 319 
(2016); see also LeDuc, supra note 134, at 317 (“Takings Clause cases present issues about the 
nature of property, fairness, the power of the state, democratic decision-making, corruption, and the 
role of property in defining individual freedom and ensuring individual autonomy.”).  
 154. Ely, supra note 154; see also Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367 (stating that 
traditionally, the government has regulated firearms-related devices heavily, and may do so in the 
interests of “the public good”); but see Harry Cheadle, A ‘Bump Stock’ Ban Would Barely Affect 
Gun Violence in America, VICE (Oct. 5, 2017, 4:39 PM), 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/wjxypw/a-bump-stock-ban-would-barely-affect-gun-violence-in-
america (“Most gun violence comes in more mundane forms: domestic abuse 
incidents . . . arguments between friends or strangers . . . or suicides—which make up the majority 
of gun deaths.  That violence generally involves handguns, rather than rifles. A bump stock ban 
wouldn’t affect any of that.”). 
 155. See infra Sections IV.B.1–2. 
 156. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 157. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 158. See infra Section IV.C. 
 159. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership 
in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 282 (2004) (“Despite the weak intellectual 
foundations for a distinction between land and personal property in regulatory takings law, the 
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Amendment states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”160  The language of the Fifth Amendment does 
not delineate differing treatment for real “private property” as opposed to 
personal “private property.”161  
The origins of the Fifth Amendment also point to a lack of foundation 
for the idea that real property should be given more weight than personal 
property.162  The Takings Clause “codified the principles of Clause 28 of 
Magna Carta and was intended to . . . [restrict] the instances in which 
government could seize a person’s property by requiring the 
government . . . to pay the person just compensation.”163  Clause 28 
specifically forbade the taking of personal property such as “corn or other 
provisions” without compensation.164  Government appropriation of personal 
property during the Revolutionary War also provided a foundation for the 
Fifth Amendment: 
That part . . . which declares that private property shall not be taken 
for public use, without just compensation, was probably intended 
to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies 
for the army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too 
frequently practised [sic] during the revolutionary war, without any 
compensation whatever.165 
The text and roots of the Takings Clause indicate no preference for the 
rights of real property owners over personal property owners and “[t]he 
historical evidence suggesting stronger constitutional protection of land is 
weak and reflects a bygone era.”166   
Judges created the idea that real property should be treated differently 
than personal property, and the Supreme Court indicated in Horne that its 
                                                          
modern Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence undoubtedly has been characterized by favoritism 
towards land.”). 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added); see also William Sumner Macdaniel, No 
Appropriation Without Compensation: How Per Se Takings of Personal Property Check the Power 
to Regulate Commerce, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 509, 521 (2017) (“Nowhere in the text of the Fifth 
Amendment is it apparent the Takings Clause was intended to apply only to real property.”). 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 162. Macdaniel, supra note 160, at 521. 
 163. Id. at 513. 
 164. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015). 
 165. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 305–06 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & 
Abraham Small 1803). 
 166. Lynda L. Butler, The Horne Dilemma: Protecting Property’s Richness and Frontiers, 75 
MD. L. REV. 787, 789 (2016). 
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future decisions may break with that precedent.167  The Supreme Court 
should finish the business it started in Horne and hold that real and personal 
property must be given equal consideration in all takings cases.168  Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for the Horne majority, stated that “[t]he 
Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes 
your car, just as when it takes your home.  The Takings Clause provides: 
‘[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.’  It protects ‘private property’ without any distinction between 
different types.”169  
Yet later in the Horne opinion, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that 
“[w]hatever Lucas had to say about reasonable expectations with regard to 
regulations, people still do not expect their property, real or personal, to be 
actually occupied or taken away.”170  The phrase “whatever Lucas had to 
say . . . with regard to regulations” introduced ambiguity and allowed the 
Court to avoid addressing whether the distinction between real and personal 
property should be abolished in all takings cases.171  It is not difficult to see 
how some courts could view Horne as reaffirming the disparate treatment of 
real and personal property in regulatory takings, while others could view 
Horne as signaling that real and personal property should be given equal 
weight.172  The Supreme Court needs to revisit Horne to finish what it 
started—establishing that real and personal property should be treated 
equally in all cases.173 
2. The Supreme Court Should Abandon Categorical Tests and Rely 
on the Penn Central Multi-Factor Test When Analyzing Takings 
Cases 
The Court should rely on the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test 
instead of implementing a string of categorical takings classifications.174  
Takings cases are diverse and can be complicated.175  Therefore, any analysis 
                                                          
 167. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427; Peñalver, supra note 159, at 233; see also Macdaniel, supra note 
160, at 540 (stating that the decision in Horne was “critical to acknowledge personal and real 
property equally in the eyes of the law”). 
 168. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426. 
 169. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 170. Id. at 2427. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Butler, supra note 166, at 795 (“The Horne decision raises more questions than it resolves.  
The Court declared that personal property is as worthy as real property of protection from physical 
takings, yet it left intact—and without explanation—the different treatment recognized in Lucas for 
regulatory takings.”). 
 173. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 174. Richard A. Epstein, The Unfinished Business of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 10 
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 734, 776 (2016). 
 175. Butler, supra note 166, at 787. 
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of such cases should be adaptable to varying circumstances.176  Takings are 
also often a question of “degree[s],” and an effective takings test should be 
able to weigh relevant factors against each other.177  
The Court should rely on the Penn Central test, an ad hoc factual 
inquiry, to determine whether government action effects a taking, instead of 
piecemeal adding categorical tests:178 
Regulatory takings claims often simultaneously implicate 
questions of basic fairness, distributive justice, utility and 
efficiency, an individual’s ability to rely on settled expectations in 
pursuit of life plans, and society’s need to regulate private activity 
for the sake of health, safety and the preservation of the 
environment for future generations.  These diverse considerations 
suggest that it will be the rare bright line test that can consistently 
do justice across a broad array of takings cases.  The much-
maligned balancing test set forth in Penn Central provides the 
needed flexibility.179 
Although Penn Central provides flexibility, it may also “raise[] more 
questions than it answers” and “yield[s] unpredictable, sometimes wildly 
inconsistent, results.”180  But the categorical classifications have done 
nothing to lessen the confusion in takings analyses, and have caused 
additional problems.181  In Loretto, which generated the first categorical 
exception to the Penn Central test, Justice Blackmun pointed out another 
danger of straying from the multi-factor test—“[T]he Court does not further 
equity so much as it encourages litigants to manipulate their factual 
allegations to gain the benefit of its per se rule.”182  The most effective way 
to streamline takings jurisprudence is for the Supreme Court to abandon the 
categorical classifications and return to a sole, if imperfect, multi-factor 
test.183   
                                                          
 176. Id. (“Both real and personal property come in many sizes, shapes, and colors.  Takings 
analysis should not ignore differences in the types of property.”). 
 177. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922). 
 178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978). 
 179. Peñalver, supra note 159, at 285–86; see also Epstein, supra note 175 (“[T]he real 
institutional mystery here is this: why the deep reliance on half measures that don’t work?  Part of 
the reason comes from the inveterate habit of Supreme Court justices to take some minimalist 
strategy as if they could break off one part of a larger whole.  But that solution results in a makeshift 
body of doctrine that no one in the end defends. . . . [I]t is precisely the eager avoidance of any clear 
theory that leaves everything up in the air.”). 
 180. Luke A. Wake, Check Your Rights at the Door: Rethinking Confiscatory Regulation, 68 
DRAKE L. REV. 123, 132 (2020). 
 181. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3184 (1982) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (“[H]istory teaches that takings claims are properly evaluated under a multifactor 
balancing test.”). 
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C. Lower Courts Would Be Able to Analyze Regulatory Takings Cases 
Such as Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. More Uniformly if Takings 
Jurisprudence Was Simplified 
Lower courts could produce more consistent and equitable outcomes by 
applying the Penn Central test instead of categorical exceptions to regulatory 
takings cases and eliminating the difference in treatment between real and 
personal property.184  For example, if these two changes were implemented 
in the case of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., there would be no need to begin an 
analysis by determining whether SB-707 was a per se taking.185  The court 
could immediately begin with the fact-based Penn Central test, weighing the 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the degree of interference 
with investment-back expectations, and the character of the government 
action.186  
1. The Economic Impact of the Regulation 
SB-707 revokes rapid fire trigger activator device owners’ right to 
possess, transport, donate, devise, transfer, or sell their devices.187  The 
owners are left with a valueless item which they must “physically 
dispossess.”188  Because the Supreme Court should give equal weight to both 
real and personal property when considering loss of economic value, the fact 
that the devices become valueless is relevant even though they are personal 
property.189  The argument that the device owners retained the right to 
transport their property out-of-state contravenes the spirit of the Takings 
Clause and is not dispositive under a classic takings analysis.190  It would be 
bad policy for any court to find that a property owner could not succeed in a 
state government takings claim so long as there remained at least one other 
state in the country where that owner would not lose all rights to his 
property.191  
                                                          
 184. See supra Section IV.B. 
 185. Begakis, supra note 128, at 1206. 
 186. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978). 
 187. Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 356, 375 (4th Cir. 2020) (Richardson, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 188. Id. (“The dispossession mandate leaves the owner with a finite list of tangible options to 
effect dispossession of their rapid fire trigger activators: destroy them, trash them, abandon them, 
or surrender them.”). 
 189. See supra Section IV.B. 
 190. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 378–79 (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits uncompensated 
takings; it does not require flight to avoid them.”). 
 191. Id. at 379 (“[I]ncorporation would be hollow indeed if it provided no protection from State 
power so long as one can go elsewhere to exercise his ‘rights.’”). 
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Additionally, the Court found takings in Loretto and Horne, despite the 
fact that the owners did not lose all of their property interests.192  SB-707 
rendered the rapid fire trigger activator devices valueless and effectively 
stripped the owners of all property rights—perhaps the most severe economic 
impact possible.193  
2. Interference with Investment-backed Expectations 
The Fourth Circuit’s argument that owners of rapid-fire trigger devices 
should have been “aware of [the] possibility” that their devices would be 
made “economically worthless” fails upon perfunctory review.194  A rational 
person simply would not purchase property with the expectation that the 
property would be rendered completely worthless and unusable, regardless 
of whether that property was firearms-related.195  Firearms have traditionally 
been heavily regulated, but these regulations often contain “use restrictions 
or registration options for existing owners” which keep them from being 
considered takings.196  
For example, proponents of banning rapid fire trigger activator devices 
compared the devices to machineguns, which were banned in 1986.197  
Machineguns themselves, however, were subject to a grandfather clause 
when they were first banned.198  An owner of a machinegun in 1986 may still 
own that same machinegun in 2021 if the owner legally registered it before 
the date of the ban’s enactment.199  An owner of a rapid fire trigger activator 
device has no such recourse because the exception clause in SB-707 is 
illusory.200  
                                                          
 192. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3176 (1982) (stating 
that the owner could still sell the property at issue, even if that right did not hold any value); see 
also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2015) (acknowledging that the owners still 
had a contingent interest in the profits from the sale of raisins that were set aside).  
 193. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 375 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 194. Id. at 367 (majority opinion). 
 195. Peñalver, supra note 159, at 251 (stating that the Lucas Court’s argument that “a reasonable 
owner of personal property . . . does not expect to receive compensation when regulation reduces 
the value of that property to zero” is “circular because it would justify the Court’s decision not to 
compensate on the basis of expectations generated in large part by the Court’s own decisions not to 
compensate”). 
 196. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 376 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 197. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356, 
369 (4th Cir. 2020) (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); 
United States v. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 238 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
 198. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 238; 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); United States v. Kuzma, 967 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that an owner of a rapid fire 
trigger activator device must have been “aware of the possibility that new 
regulation might . . . render his property economically worthless,” when 
machineguns, an analogous device, were historically grandfathered in.201  At 
most, an owner may have been aware that a grandfather clause would limit 
the extent of his property rights in the future, not that those rights would be 
abolished completely.202  Because the Supreme Court should give the 
expectations of real and personal property owners the same consideration, 
the fact that the devices are personal property should not lessen the device 
owners’ expectation that they would retain their property rights.203 
3. Character of the Government Action 
SB-707 did not involve direct physical appropriation of the rapid fire 
trigger activators, but the resulting effects of the regulation are tantamount to 
physical invasion.204  The most severe form of government intrusion is an 
actual physical occupation or appropriation of real or personal property, and 
SB-707 did not involve such an intrusion.205  The statute did, however, 
revoke the rapid fire trigger activator device owners’ right to possess, 
transport, donate, devise, transfer, or sell their devices—in effect requiring 
owners to “physically dispossess themselves” of their property.206  
Additionally, the fact that the government included an exception clause 
in SB-707 shows that the government could have achieved its ends without 
revoking the existing property owners’ rights to possess the rapid fire trigger 
activators.207  The exception clause from SB-707 purported to allow device 
owners to continue to possess their rapid fire trigger activator devices after 
enactment of the statute, but the clause was defunct.208  Because the ATF is 
a federal agency, it was unable to process applications related to SB-707, a 
state law, as required by the SB-707 exception clause.  If the clause was 
functional, allowing for the continued lawful ownership of the devices, SB-
                                                          
 201. Id. at 365 (majority opinion); 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 238. 
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707 would not be a taking.209  The exception clause shows that the State 
acknowledged that it could accomplish its goal to increase public safety 
without revoking the existing owners’ right to possess the devices.210  
Without a functioning exception clause, SB-707 encroaches on private 
property rights more than is necessary to accomplish legitimate state 
interests—the exact type of government action the Takings Clause is meant 
to address.211  
The legislature aimed to use SB-707 to increase public safety—a 
legitimate state interest—however, “a strong public desire to improve the 
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter 
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”212  By analyzing 
the facts of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. using the Penn Central multi-factor 
test and treating real and personal property equally, it is clear that SB-707 
exceeds the state’s police power and is therefore a regulatory taking requiring 
just compensation.213  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan,214 the Fourth Circuit considered 
whether SB-707 was a taking requiring just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.215  The court held that the statute was not a 
per se taking because it did not involve direct physical appropriation of 
personal property by the government.216  Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. is an 
important case—not because of the facts themselves—but because of the way 
the Fourth Circuit analyzed the facts.217  The majority omitted the Supreme 
Court’s competing and evolving regulatory takings precedent, which was 
nonetheless addressed by the dissent.218  
The contrasting opinions in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. showcase the 
inconsistencies in takings precedent and the resulting complexity lower 
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courts face when analyzing regulatory takings cases.219  The Supreme Court 
needs to revisit this area of law, abandon its use of categorical classifications, 
and hold that real property and personal property be given the same weight 
under the Takings Clause.220  If the Supreme Court clarifies its Takings 
Clause jurisprudence, cases like Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. could be decided 
by lower courts in a more consistent manner.221 
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